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Abstract In the decade following hepatitis B vaccine’s 1981 approval, U.S. health officials
issued evolving guidelines on who should receive the vaccine: first, gay men, injection drug
users, and healthcare workers; later, hepatitis B-positive women’s children; and later still,
all newborns. States laws that mandated the vaccine for all children were quietly accepted
in the 1990s; in the 2000s, however, popular anti-vaccine sentiment targeted the shot as an
emblem of immunization policy excesses. Shifting attitudes toward the vaccine in this
period were informed by hepatitis B’s changing popular image, legible in textual and visual
representations of the infection from the 1980s through the 1990s. Notably, the outbreak of
AIDS, the advent of genetically engineered pharmaceuticals, and a Democratic push for
health reform shaped and reshaped hepatitis B’s public image. Hepatitis B thus became, in
turn, an AIDS-like scourge; proof of a new era of pharmaceuticals; a threat from which all
American children had a right to be protected; and a cancer-causing infection spread by
teenage lifestyles. The metamorphosis of the infection’s image was reflected in evolving
policy recommendations regarding who should receive the vaccine in the 1980s, and was
key to securing broad uptake of the vaccine in the 1990s.
Keywords Hepatitis B . Vaccines . Vaccination . Representations . Imagery . HIV. Health
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Introduction
Today, most newborns in the United States are vaccinated against the hepatitis B virus,
usually in the first few days of life.1 The practice of vaccinating infants against hepatitis B,
a blood-borne virus that attacks the liver, is a popular target for contemporary vaccine
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critics, who for the last decade have argued that the virus is a sexually-transmitted infection
that poses little or no risk to babies. Indeed, this is how federal health officials themselves
characterized the virus back in 1981 when they first approved the vaccine. However, by
2000, 47 states had mandated the vaccine for all schoolchildren with little or no resistance
from parents. The widespread adoption of hepatitis B vaccine mandates in the 1990s thus
raises the question: how did a vaccine with such a limited initial target population come to
be accepted as compulsory for every child in the country?
The answer lies in an examination of gradual adjustments to the image of hepatitis B
infection, an image created and recreated by ever-shifting verbal descriptions, media
portrayals, and textual descriptions of the disease in the two decades following the
vaccine’s introduction. Prior to the approval of the hepatitis B vaccine by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), the virus was rarely the object of media attention and was only
faintly visible to the American public. But as scientific discoveries leading to the vaccine
accumulated, hepatitis B acquired an increasingly public image. Initially, in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, the image of hepatitis B constructed by popular portrayals was that of a
deadly but foreign infection, a scientific obscurity of little direct relevance to most
Americans. Shifting cultural, scientific, and political preoccupations, however, acted to
reshape continually this (not strictly visual) image, as evidenced in media and scientific
reports on hepatitis B and the policies that made it mandatory for children in the 1980s and
1990s. In particular, the outbreak of AIDS in the early 1980s, the advent of genetically-
engineered pharmaceuticals in the late 1980s, and the political push for health reform in the
early 1990s all left an indelible imprint on the picture of hepatitis B being held up before
Americans. Through these constantly shifting portrayals, hepatitis B became, in turn, a
sexually transmitted AIDS-like scourge; an example of the promise of a new era of
pharmaceuticals; a threat from which all American children had a right to be protected; and
a cancer-causing infection spread by teenage lifestyles. Examination of these shifting
representations of hepatitis B reveals the process by which the virus was framed as a
widespread infection worth preventing by the universal vaccination of children. In the case
of hepatitis B, the metamorphosis of the infection’s image was reflected in constantly
revolving policy recommendations regarding who should receive the vaccine in the 1980s,
and was ultimately key to securing broad uptake of the infection’s vaccine in the 1990s.
“A disease affecting health workers, male homosexuals and drug addicts”
Like many twentieth-century pharmaceutical discoveries, the development of the hepatitis B
vaccine was, in part, a matter of happenstance. In 1963, research physician, Baruch
Blumberg, was investigating variations in susceptibility to infections among different ethnic
and racial groups when he identified a protein in the blood of Australian aborigines, which he
dubbed the Australia antigen. Blumberg and colleagues initially surmised that the protein was
inherited, but they soon noted a correlation between Australia antigen in the blood and
hepatitis B infection, then called serum hepatitis. Gradually, the researchers came to suspect
that Australia antigen, which floated freely in the blood of people infected with hepatitis B,
was part of the virus that caused hepatitis. In 1967, they determined that Australia antigen
was, in fact, a surface protein on the virus that caused the disease; the discovery quickly led to
a test to screen blood and diagnose patients. In related research, Blumberg and colleagues
found that monkeys injected with highly purified Australia antigen (later renamed hepatitis B
surface antigen or HBsAg) did not progress to serum hepatitis; the discovery suggested that
non-infectious material could be separated from the virus itself. In 1969, the researchers
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patented the process for separating and purifying the antigen. The basis for the development
of a vaccine, what Blumberg called “the most significant outcome” of their work, had thus
been discovered.2
Over the course of the 1970s, the diagnostic test that Blumberg’s research group had
developed revealed the full extent of the hepatitis B epidemic, both in the U.S. and around the
world. Two distinct forms of hepatitis, A and B (formerly infectious and serum hepatitis,
respectively) had been known since the 1950s, but countless cases of the latter had gone
undetected, in large part because of the vague symptomatic presentation of hepatitis B
infection. Infection may or may not cause acute symptoms, including debilitating fatigue,
nausea, and loss of appetite, and acute symptoms may or may not be fatal. Those who do
recover may or may not become chronic carriers. Carriers, in turn, may or may not become
victims, decades later, of hepatitis-induced cirrhosis or liver cancer.3 Furthermore, hepatitis B’s
fairly mundane acute symptoms meant that, for decades, it was routinely confused with other
conditions. In the 1970s, however, armed with the newly developed diagnostic protocols,
researchers identified for the first time more than 200,000 new cases in the U.S. each year, and
more than 200 million carriers worldwide. Concurrent epidemiological studies also identified
those at highest risk of the disease; in addition to health care workers, the list included
hemophiliacs, prisoners, gay men, injection drug users, sex workers, native Alaskans, and
immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, China, and southeast Asia.4
As development of a vaccine against the infection accelerated in the late 1970s,
Blumberg and other infectious disease experts predicted that effective vaccine would save
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of lives.5 But news of the potential vaccine, and of
hepatitis B itself, rarely reached lay audiences over the course of the 1970s. The disease did
have isolated moments in the spotlight: in 1974, Dr. Norman Pastorek, host of the television
show Today’s Health, developed acute hepatitis B when a surgical patient’s blood splashed
in his eye; he chronicled in detail the disease’s “mean, sneaky malevolence” on air and in
print.6 Two years later, hepatitis B made headlines again when Blumberg shared the Nobel
Prize in Medicine for his work on the disease.7 The press also reported on the 1979
outbreak of hepatitis B among youth who shared needles to inject the recreational drug
methylene deoxyamphetamine.8 Such stories began to illustrate the picture emerging from
epidemiological studies for the public: that the disease posed a risk to specific subsets of the
population including surgeons and drug users. However, the image sketched by such stories
was faint, as for most of the 1970s, the public heard—and likely understood—very little
about hepatitis B.
On the eve of the hepatitis B vaccine’s introduction, lay Americans therefore had little
reason to view the disease as a direct threat to their health. Early press reports on the
vaccine continually reaffirmed this notion. In 1980, the CBS evening news reported that
while hepatitis B struck developing countries in Asia and Africa in “epidemic proportions,”
in the U.S., it affected mainly “patients on dialysis, medical personnel, and people living in
institutions.”9 News anchor, Dan Rather, echoed this when he reported on the hepatitis B
2 B.S. Blumberg, Hepatitis B: The Hunt for a Killer Virus (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
3 Ibid.
4 W. Muraskin, “Hepatitis B as a Model (and Anti-Model) for AIDS,” in AIDS and Contemporary History,
eds. V. Berridge and P. Strong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 108–132.
5 Blumberg, 134–136.
6 N. Pastorek, “Hepatitis,” Today’s Health, September 1974, 46+.
7 B. Rensberger, “Sketches of Two Winners of Nobel Prizes in Medicine,” New York Times, 15 October
1976, 13.
8 Anonymous, “A Wave of Death from Hepatitis,” Newsweek, 27 August 1979, 72.
9 CBS Evening News, September 29, 1980, (Vanderbilt Television News Archive).
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vaccine’s approval in 1981, stating that a vaccine had been approved for “a disease
affecting health workers, male homosexuals, and drug addicts.”10 On NBC, the evening
news anchor described hepatitis B to the public as follows: “Hospital workers get it, so do
drug addicts, mental patients, homosexuals, and millions of people in Africa and Asia.” The
network’s subsequent segment on the vaccine focused largely on the “medical adventure
story” of the virus’s discovery, which a reporter recounted over grainy images of
Aborigines in native attire.11
Historian William Muraskin has argued that representation of hepatitis B was
deliberately constructed by a medical profession acting in self-interest. Having been
identified as a high-risk group themselves, health care workers, in Muraskin’s analysis,
endeavored to define hepatitis B infection as an issue “private” to their profession and
outside the public’s purview. The media, reliant on the medical community for information
about the virus, reported what they were told: that gays, injection drug users, and certain
immigrants and refugees were at high risk and that the spread of hepatitis in iatrogenic
settings was controlled through the use of gowns, masks, gloves, and other hygienic
practices. The health care profession’s internal policy—of voluntary testing for carrier
status—became the implicit policy toward the population at large, as well. The resulting
public ignorance, Muraskin concludes, was two sided: it prevented “hysteria and
discrimination of carriers,” but it also hampered public awareness of the extent of the
epidemic and the true risk of infection.12 Muraskin’s assessment assumes that the risk of
infection was widespread at this time; regardless of whether this was the case, what is clear
is that in the period prior to the approval of the hepatitis B vaccine, the popular impression
of the virus as posing little threat to “average Americans” had been deeply forged.
Two novel vaccines
The hepatitis B vaccine approved by the FDA in 1981 was an unusual product in the
history of viral vaccine development. Instead of containing live, weakened virus or killed,
denatured virus, Heptavax B, as it was called, contained purified antibodies harvested from
the blood of people infected with the virus. In a display of awe and enthusiasm for scientific
discovery, the same news reporters who had downplayed the disease’s risk for average
Americans played up, in the next breath, the new vaccine’s novel form. Dan Rather
reported that the vaccine was the “first completely new viral vaccine in 10 years,” and the
“first vaccine ever licensed in the United States that is made directly from human blood.”13
When clinical trials revealed that the vaccine was over 92% protective, Newsweek called its
blood-derived antibodies “ingenious,” and magazines from Time to Glamour called the
vaccine a “medical breakthrough.”14 Fervent reports in popular and scientific journals
proclaimed that hepatitis B—still a little-known disease to the American public—would
10 CBS Evening News, November 16, 1981, (Vanderbilt Television News Archive).
11 NBC Nightly News, November 16, 1981, (Vanderbilt Television News Archive).
12 W. Muraskin, “The Silent Epidemic: The Social, Ethical, and Medical Problems Surrounding the Fight
against Hepatitis B,” Journal of Social History 22 (1988): 277–298.
13 CBS Evening News, November 16, 1981.
14 J. Seligman, “AVaccine for Hepatitis,” Newsweek, 13 October 1980, 132; Anonymous, “Hepatitis Hope,”
Time, 13 October 1980; C. Sherman, “Hepatitis: Why It’s So Common,” Glamour, March 1981, 268.
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soon join such well-known pathogenic villains as smallpox and polio as a problem of the
past.15
Such rhetoric was quickly dampened by another discovery, however. The clinical trials
that had tested the vaccine in the 1970s had included only gay men who had been identified
as being at high risk of the infection. When, in 1982, the federal Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP) issued its customary recommendations on who should
receive the vaccine, the list included those considered to be at highest risk for the disease,
including gay men, injection drug users, sex workers, health care workers with blood
contact, and select immigrants. But the FDA’s approval of the plasma-derived vaccine had
closely coincided with reports of a deadly new disease among gay men. Within a year,
health officials had documented a high rate of hepatitis B infection not only among gay
men but also among gay men who were sufferers of AIDS. The announcement spurred
fears that the new vaccine was contaminated with AIDS.16 In 1982 and 1983, newspapers
reported that gay men and injection drug users were frequent blood donors for the vaccine
and that many health care workers had refused the vaccine for this very reason.17
Restrictions on blood donation—and a lack of evidence linking AIDS cases to the new
vaccine—appeared to quell such fears.18 But the emergence of AIDS had a profound and
lasting impact on the nature of media representations of hepatitis B. No sooner did the
potential link between hepatitis B vaccination and HIV infection fade from media reports
than a new link between the two viruses emerged; this new link, a recitation of the
similarities between the two infections, would persist in popular and scientific discourse for
well over a decade. The analogy between AIDS and hepatitis B infection had been drawn
early on by epidemiologists working to discover the causative agent of AIDS. Both
diseases, scientists noted, appeared to be transmitted sexually, showing a pattern of
infection among injection drug users and blood transfusion recipients. When the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) identified the groups at “high-risk” for AIDS in 1983—gay men
with multiple sex partners, I.V. drug users, Haitian immigrants and hemophiliacs—these
closely mirrored the list earlier reported to be at high risk of hepatitis B.19 Such parallels
were repeatedly echoed by the media. As a 1985 cover story on AIDS in Time pointed out,
both diseases were scourges of “drug addicts, blood recipients and gay men,” and
researchers were uncertain as to whether hepatitis B was a “co-agent of AIDS or merely [a]
tagalong infection.”20
Media coverage also pointed out not only how hepatitis B was similar to AIDS but also
how it was worse: 15 times more common, 200 times more infectious, far more stable in
the environment, responsible for far more deaths, and, unlike HIV, spread by casual
15 See Seligman, 132 and L. Altman, “Tests of Hepatitis B Vaccine Show Nearly Complete Rate of
Protection,” New York Times, 29 September 1980, A1.
16 D. Dickson, “AIDS Fears Spark Row over Vaccine,” Science, 221 (1983): 437.
17 On health care workers refusing vaccine, see UPI, “Two Doctors in U.S. Agency Back Hepatitis B
Vaccine,” New York Times, 11 February 1983, A14.
18 See for example C. Russell, “U.S. Issues New Policy on Transfusions to Avoid AIDS Disease,”
Washington Post, 4 March 1983, A3; Centers for Disease Control, “Hepatitis B Vaccine: Evidence
Confirming Lack of AIDS Transmission,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 33 (1984): 685.
19 This pattern has been noted by G. Oppenheimer, “In the Eye of the Storm: The Epidemiological
Construction of AIDS,” in AIDS: The Burdens of History, eds. E. Fee and D. Fox (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1988), 267. For an example, see Centers for Disease Control, “Recommendation of the
Immunization Practices Advisory Committee (ACIP) Inactivated Hepatitis B Virus Vaccine,” Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report 31; 24 (1982), 317–322.
20 C. Wallis, “AIDS: A Growing Threat,” Time, 12 August 1985.
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contact.21 But the public could take solace, the vice chair of the National Foundation for
Infectious Diseases pointed out in a letter to the New York Times, in the fact that a vaccine
existed to keep this “cousin of AIDS” at bay.22 This message, that the hepatitis B vaccine
was a beacon of hope in a time of fear, was repeated often in the press. There’s no cure for
AIDS, Gay Community News told readers, but there is one for hepatitis B, which kills five
times as many people each year.23 Mademoiselle issued the same message: “There is no
AIDS vaccine yet, but there are two new ones against hepatitis B.”24
That second hepatitis B vaccine, widely available by the late 1980s, was a vastly
different product from the first, blood-derived vaccine. Recombivax HB, the genetically-
engineered hepatitis B vaccine approved in 1986, contained viral proteins not harvested
from diseased patients in the clinical setting but rather manufactured by recombinant yeast
in the lab. Before it was licensed, press reports hailed Recombivax B for its potential to
prove that genetic engineering would revolutionize the pharmaceutical industry. Scientists
and the reporters who quoted them called biotech vaccines “exciting and imaginative,” and
referred to the hepatitis B vaccine specifically as a “pioneering product.”25 Researchers told
the New York Times that biotech shots were “cutting edge weapons” that would eliminate
not only hepatitis B but also AIDS and malaria.26 The business press breathlessly reported
on the race between “tiny” California biotech firms to produce the world’s first genetically-
engineered vaccine, and when Chiron’s Recombivax was approved, Venture magazine
crowned it one of the best entrepreneurial ideas of 1986.27 The approval of Recombivax
HB—the first genetically-engineered vaccine and the fifth genetically-engineered pharma-
ceutical to make it to market—was heralded on the front pages of the New York Times, the
Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal and elsewhere for ushering in what FDA
commissioner, Frank Young, called a “new era in vaccine production.”28
That era was long awaited. In the 1960s, lawsuits over polio vaccine tainted with live
virus had prompted half the nation’s vaccine manufacturers to pull out of the market
altogether—a fact the business press repeated as they reported on the new vaccine.29 The
genetically-engineered hepatitis B vaccine was enthusiastically received by investors, the
pharmaceutical industry, and health professionals not only because it held the promise of a
new generation of vaccines (and thus new markets), but also for its potential to address
safety concerns that had damaged the industry and shaken consumer confidence. In the
words of the Wall Street Journal’s editorial board, Chiron’s discovery brought an end to the
days when vaccine development was “an inexact scientific art.”30 “We see no reason why
our approach won’t work with virtually any infectious disease, whether it is viral, bacterial
21 C. Sacra, “AVaccine for Lovers,” Health 21 (1989): 47.
22 S. Kuvin, “Vaccination Can Halt Epidemic of Hepatitis B, Cousin of AIDS,” New York Times, 9 April
1989, E24.
23 Anonymous, “Hepatitis, Health, and the Hard Sell,” Gay Community News, 10 September 1983.
24 N. Geary, “Health News: Hepatitis B,” Mademoiselle, April 1993, 120.
25 See for example, C. Wallis, “Made-to-Order Vaccines,” Time, 31 October 1983; and J. Castro, “A
Breakthrough for Biotech,” Time, 4 August 1986.
26 H. Schmeck, “The New Age of Vaccines,” New York Times Magazine, 29 April 1984, 58+.
27 See for example J. Packer, “Chiron Nears Sale of New Hepatitis Vaccine,” San Jose Business Journal 3;
41 (1986): 3; and T. Post, D. Eberwine, D.G. Winder and E.M. Ebler, “The Year’s Best Entrepreneurial
Ideas,” Venture 8; 12 (1986): 28.
28 P. Boffey, “U.S. Approves a Genetically Altered Vaccine,” New York Times, 24 July 1986, A1; M.
Cimons, “First Human Vaccine Produced by Genetic Engineering OK’d by FDA,” Los Angeles Times, 24
July 1986, 1; and J. Davidson, “Lab-Made Vaccine for Hepatitis B Is Cleared by FDA,” Wall Street Journal,
24 July 1986, 1.
29 G. Geipel, “A Shot in the Arm for Vaccine Makers,” Business Week, 4 August 1986, 29.
30 Editorial, “Science and Demagoguery,” Wall Street Journal, 31 July 1986, 1.
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or even parasitic in nature,” one researcher told Time.31 Nodding implicitly toward past and
present fears, another researcher told the magazine that genetically-engineered vaccines
eliminated the “risk of actually getting herpes, hepatitis B or influenza from the injection,
since the viruses themselves are not present in the formula.”32 Because the new vaccine did
not contain a whole virus, it “just can’t do any damage, period,” promised FDA
microbiologist Richard Daemer.33 These sentiments were echoed by FDA Commissioner
Young in a press statement he made on the occasion of Recombivax’s approval. “These
techniques should be…extended to any virus or parasite,” he stated. He went on to say that
while the plasma-derived vaccine had never posed a risk of AIDS, the new “lab-made
vaccine” should further reassure people. He also strongly urged those at high risk of
hepatitis B to take advantage of this “new life-saving protection.”34
A push for widespread vaccination
Young’s plea came as public health officials were bemoaning stubbornly low hepatitis B
vaccination rates. In the 5 years since the ACIP had recommended that gay men, injection
drug users, health care workers, and select immigrants be vaccinated against the infection,
hepatitis B prevalence had not decreased but rather increased, with rates particularly high
among young adults.35 Incrementally, federal recommendations evolved in response. In
1988, the ACIP recommended that all pregnant women be tested for hepatitis B, and, if
positive, their infants vaccinated within 12 h of birth to prevent transmission to the next
generation.36 When disease incidence persisted at high rates, the ACIP altered its strategy
again, recommending universal infant vaccination against hepatitis B in 1991.37 Health
officials acknowledged that the new strategy was necessary “because vaccinating persons
engaged in high-risk behaviors, life-styles or occupations…has not been feasible” and
because many infected people had “no identifiable source for their infections.”38
The message that just about everyone was at risk of hepatitis B came to dominate media
reports on the disease by the early 1990s. Outlets from the Philadelphia Tribune to Good
Housekeeping reported that a third of people with the disease were not in any of the known
risk groups.39 Redbook warned readers that hepatitis was “spreading fast,” and the Boston
Globe noted that hepatitis was spread by sharing gum, food, toothbrushes, and razors and
by body piercing.40 New York magazine, in a feature titled, “The Other Plague,” recounted
31 Wallis, “Made-to-Order Vaccines.”
32 Ibid.
33 D. Stehlin, “Hepatitis B: Available Vaccine Safe and Underused,” FDA Consumer Magazine, May 1990.
34 Associated Press, “FDA Approves Gene-Engineered Hepatitis Vaccine,” Dallas Morning News, 24 July
1986, 5A.
35 Centers for Disease Control. “Surveillance Summary Viral Hepatitis—1984,” Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report 36; 3 (1987), 42–43.
36 Centers for Disease Control. “Recommendations of the Immunization Practices Advisory Committee—
Prevention of Perinatal Transmission of Hepatitis B Virus: Prenatal Screening of All Pregnant Women for
Hepatitis B Surface Antigen,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 37; 22 (1988), 341–346, 351.
37 Centers for Disease Control. “Hepatitis B Virus: A Comprehensive Strategy for Eliminating Transmission
in the United States through Universal Childhood Vaccination: Recommendations of the Immunization
Practices Advisory Committee (ACIP),” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 40; RR-13 (1991), 1–19.
38 Ibid.
39 Anonymous, “Hepatitis B 200x More Contagious Than AIDS,” Philadelphia Tribune, 31 December 1991,
4B; L. Holland, “The ABC’s of Hepatitis,” Good Housekeeping, April 1991, 239.
40 L. Laurence, “Beware the Quiet Killer,” Redbook, October 1991, 24; S. Coleman, “Q&Awith Leslie Hsu,”
Boston Globe, 15 February 1998, 2.
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the stories of a young woman who contracted a fatal case by getting her ears pierced, a
young man who was infected when mugged at knife-point, and a woman infected at a nail
salon.41 Frequent mention of the prevalence of asymptomatic carriers heightened the sense
of an immediate health threat: in the words of the New York magazine reporter, anyone
could be one of the U.S.’s 1.5 million “Typhoid Marys,” unwittingly transmitting hepatitis
B to people unaware of their risk.42
Meanwhile, health officials at the CDC were considering not just revised recommen-
dations to increase hepatitis B vaccination but a broader program to encourage higher
vaccination rates overall. The worst measles epidemic in over a decade had swept the nation
in 1989 and 1990, infecting more than 50,000 people and causing hundreds of deaths.43
Rates of rubella and pertussis were also on the rise. When a federal vaccine advisory panel
(a panel distinct from the ACIP) studied the measles outbreaks, their resulting White Paper
concluded that the epidemic was driven by low immunization rates among pre-school-aged
children.44 (Immunization of schoolchildren, by contrast, had reached a peak in the early
1980s following a national immunization campaign sponsored by Jimmy Carter’s
administration.) Low immunization rates among the very young, the panel argued, were
the result of costly vaccines, inadequate insurance policies, and other barriers to health care.
The nation’s failure to immunize all susceptible children was, in their assessment, the result
of a broken health care system, an issue that had become a top concern for most Americans
on the eve of the 1992 presidential election.
In that race, presidential candidate Bill Clinton had campaigned—and was elected—on a
platform that emphasized the need to fix the nation’s ailing health care system.45 His first
month in office, he proposed a measure that amounted to health reform in miniature, a
billion dollar “universal purchase” program, in which the federal government would
become the sole buyer of all vaccines and distribute them free of cost to all children,
regardless of family income.46 As Congress debated the proposal, Clinton spent the spring
of 1993 championing the cause of childhood immunization. His administration spread the
message that vaccines were a child’s basic right, one being violated by greedy drug
companies. “Our message to the drug companies today is…you’re not going to profit at the
expense of our children,” Clinton said at one press conference.47 The head of the National
Vaccine Program Office told the New York Times that immunization had become “a
privilege,” with the implication that it was the right of all children to be vaccinated.48
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, expounded on this line of
41 J.H. Tanne, “The Other Plague: Potentially Deadly Hepatitis Is Fifteen Times More Common Than
AIDS,” New York, 11 July 1988, 34.
42 Ibid, 35.
43 Centers for Disease Control. “Current Trends Measles—United States 1990,” Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report 40; 22 (1991), 369–372.
44 National Vaccine Advisory Committee, “The Measles Epidemic: The Problems, Barriers, and
Recommendations ” JAMA 266; 11 (1991): 1547–1552; see also P. Hilts, “Panel Ties Measles Epidemic to
Breakdown in Health System,” New York Times, 9 January 1991, A17.
45 For an analysis of the Clinton health reform effort, see T. Skocpol, Boomerang: Clinton’s Health Security
Effort and the Turn against Government in U.S. Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996).
46 C. Rasco, Summary, Comprehensive Childhood Immunization Act of 1993, Folder 6, Box 14, Domestic
Policy Council, Rasco Subject File, William J. Clinton Presidential Library.
47 W. J. Clinton, Statement of the President, Arlington County Department of Human Services, 2/12/93,
Folder 7, Box 14, Domestic Policy Council, Rasco Subject File, William J. Clinton Presidential Library.
48 R. Pear, “Clinton Considers Plan to Vaccinate All U.S. Children,” New York Times, 1 February 1993, A1.
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thinking, equating a child’s right to vaccination with the commonly accepted rights of
children to clean air, clean water, and public education.49
But vaccination was not just about rights for the administration, which also saw it as a
means of reining in runaway health care costs. In addition to a broken health care system,
Clinton had inherited a ruined economy, and he saw the two as tightly linked. In the spring
of 1993, his administration promoted vaccines for children as an important way to save
health care dollars. “Each day we delay really making a commitment to our children carries
a dear cost,” Clinton said before a joint session of Congress.50 “We now know that we will
save $10 later for every $1 we spend by eliminating childhood diseases. That’s a good
investment no matter how you measure it.”51
Pharmaceutical companies stringently opposed the Clinton plan, arguing that it would make
vaccines unprofitable and bring the development of new vaccines to a halt.52 To an extent,
many in Congress agreed. The vaccine proposal that ultimately passed as part of the 1993
budget act replaced universal purchase with a $300 million plan to provide immunizations to
Native American children, those on Medicaid, and those who lacked insurance coverage or
coverage for vaccines. The new Vaccines for Children program provided states with added
funds for vaccination and guaranteed their ability to purchase vaccines at federal contract
prices, making low-cost vaccines available to children in both public clinics and private
practices.53 That same spring, Clinton signed a proclamation supporting National Preschool
Immunization Week, an annual week of coordinated efforts to fully vaccinate preschoolers
with all federally recommended vaccines—including the vaccine against hepatitis B.54
The enactment of the Vaccines for Children program coincided with a broadened set of
hepatitis B vaccine recommendations by the ACIP, which now urged that all 11- and
12-year-olds be vaccinated against the virus. The committee stressed that universal infant
vaccination should continue, but that adolescent vaccination was needed to cause disease
incidence to decline more quickly. Health officials were blunt in justifying the widespread
vaccination of youth. Vaccinating high-risk adults had proved enormously difficult, an
ACIP statement noted, but routine childhood vaccination would obviate vaccination of
adults.55 “We do not feel that targeting adults for vaccination has worked,” a CDC official
told the Boston Globe. “This will be the first time,” she went on, “that a vaccine is
recommended for children to prevent a disease that primarily occurs in adults.”56
As state health boards and legislatures began taking steps to mandate the hepatitis B
vaccine for infants, kindergartners, and 7th graders, many directly attributed these steps to
the new federal program. Minnesota’s vaccine task force credited the Clinton changes for
the extra funds and discount pricing that made it feasible to require the hepatitis B vaccine
49 R. Pear, “Clinton, in Compromise, Will Cut Parts of Childhood Vaccine Plan,” New York Times, 5 May
1993, A1.
50 W.J. Clinton, Address before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals, February 17, 1993
(The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara).
51 Ibid.
52 J. Cohen, “Childhood Vaccines: The R&D Factor,” Science 259 (1993): 1528.
53 G. Freed and S. Katz, “The Comprehensive Childhood Immunization Act of 1993: Toward a More
Rational Approach,” New England Journal of Medicine 329; 26 (1993): 1957.
54 W.J. Clinton, Remarks by the President at Reading of Immunization Proclamation, Office of the Press
Secretary, 4/12/93, William J. Clinton Presidential Library. (Available at http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/
archivesearch.html)
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for 7th graders.57 State health officials in Colorado, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and elsewhere
also credited the administration for making it possible to require the new vaccine for
students, hold school-based drives to encourage vaccination, and enforce new mandates—
since all students were now guaranteed vaccine, regardless of their ability to pay.58
At the same time, the rhetoric that once tightly linked hepatitis B to AIDS was beginning
to diminish. A 1994 educational campaign by the National Foundation for Infectious
Disease featured Dr. Ruth, who continued to inform audiences that hepatitis B was “100
times more infectious than HIV.”59 But when states like Idaho, California, and
Pennsylvania mandated the vaccine in the following years, health officials and legislators
cited not the opportunity to prevent an HIV-like scourge but, instead, the growing
popularity of tattoos and body piercing, and the increased presence of diabetic syringes in
schools, as justification.60 And although characterizations of hepatitis B as a sexually-
transmitted disease persisted, they increasingly gave way to characterizations of the virus as
a preventable infection linked to cancer. “This is a very safe and effective way to avoid
what is a terrible disease that causes cancer and other chronic problems,” said the head of
Colorado’s health board on that state’s decision to mandate the vaccine for school.61
Vaccination resistance emerges
The majority of state laws mandating hepatitis B vaccination for children thus went into
effect between 1994 and 1998, taking advantage of federal enthusiasm for universal
vaccination and funding support for recommended vaccines. When these laws were first
introduced, members of the public with a lay understanding of hepatitis B most likely
viewed it as an illness comparable to AIDS, if not in some ways worse—and yet
preventable with a safe, new, cutting edge vaccine. But as hepatitis B vaccine laws became
the norm, a debate over the merits of the shot began to simmer.
The debate that began to emerge in the late 1990s over the safety and appropriateness of
the hepatitis B vaccine for children fit into a larger series of debates over vaccine safety that
spanned the entire twentieth century and accelerated toward its end. In 1982, when a
media exposé publicized a scientific dispute over the safety of pertussis vaccine,62 it
galvanized a previously diffuse set of vaccine-anxious parents to lobby for new vaccine
policies. The resulting 1986 National Vaccine Injury Compensation Act provided
compensation for the families of vaccine-injured children and established the Vaccine
Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS), which began tracking reports of vaccine-
related harms in 1990.63 By 1999, 42 states had mandated the hepatitis B vaccine for
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students, and over 25,000 reports of adverse events linked to the vaccine had been
reported to VAERS. Scientists asserted that the mere number of events was far from
proof of causation of harm, but parents insisted the figures revealed a different
truth.
In the subsequent wave of reporting on hepatitis B, media reports focused on the
perspective of patients, not scientists. In 1998, the media reported on France’s decision to
halt hepatitis B vaccination because of fears the shot caused neurological damage.64 Early
in 1999, the television news program 20/20 aired a report on adults with impairments
thought to be linked to the vaccine and an infant who died shortly after receiving the
vaccine.65 In the spring of 1999, a House Committee held hearings on hepatitis B vaccine
safety concerns. The hearings attempted to weigh the potential risks of the vaccine against
the risks of what appeared, by this time, to be two very different diseases. To officials from
the CDC and members of the American Liver Foundation and Hepatitis Foundation,
hepatitis B was, primarily, a lethal disease that infected one in 20 Americans and caused
5,000 deaths each year, many of these from liver cancer. To members of Massachusetts
Citizens for Vaccination Choice and Parents Requesting Open Vaccination Education, and
to the doctors and parents who had witnessed blindness, deafness, seizures, and other
effects in children following vaccination, hepatitis B was instead a rare, sexually-
transmitted infection that threatened drug addicts and foreigners and that posed no risk to
American infants from healthy families.66
Conclusion
When New Jersey attempted to mandate the hepatitis B vaccine for its schoolchildren later
that same year, some parents and a lone legislator resisted, citing reports of hazards and the
inappropriateness of the vaccine for youth.67 New Jersey’s mandate easily passed, but in the
years that followed, anti-vaccine and vaccine safety groups grew increasingly active. They
were especially galvanized by news of potentially harmful levels of mercury in vaccines,
the withdrawal of a new vaccine against rotavirus from the market because of safety
concerns, and a now notorious study that purported to link the MMR vaccine to autism. As
anti-vaccination sentiment swelled in the 2000s, the hepatitis B vaccine was often held
by critics as proof that policies were not always devised in the best interest of children.
Critics looked to early scientific representations of hepatitis B as a sexually-transmitted
disease affecting specific strata of the adult population as evidence in support of their
position. “You pop out of the womb and the first thing you get is a shot for a sexually-
transmitted disease,” one frustrated father told USA Today in 1999.68 The argument
provided traction for vaccine critics over the course of the ensuing decade, a decade in
which popular vaccination resistance grew. “Do we really need hepatitis B on the second
day of life?” implored actor and vaccine critic Jim Carey on CNN’s Larry King Live in
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2009. “The vaccine program is unbalanced,” he said. “It’s a good thing that’s gone too
far.”69
Recent opposition to the hepatitis B vaccine is, of course, just one episode in the long
history of alternate acceptance and rejection of vaccination. In the early days of AIDS,
hepatitis B was portrayed as a related infection urgently worth preventing; this association
helped place the virus on par with such dreaded but also vaccine-preventable diseases as
polio and smallpox, guaranteeing its position in the arsenal of childhood vaccines. But as
AIDS became a pharmaceutically-manageable infection, and as parental concerns turned
increasingly toward the rising prevalence of autism and other neurological conditions, the
perceived risks of hepatitis B infection became overshadowed, for many, by the perceived
risks of vaccination. The pattern is a familiar one in the history of vaccination resistance;
historians James Colgrove and Dorothy Porter have both described a similar trend in public
attitudes toward the polio vaccine as prevalence of that disease diminished.70 Progressive
Era anti-vaccinationists, described by historian Robert Johnston, likewise came to perceive
the vaccine against smallpox as riskier than a chance with the disease itself.71
Before hepatitis B vaccine became the target of vaccination resistors, however, it was, at
least briefly, accepted widely as an addition to the spectrum of vaccines for children. The
factors key to securing the vaccine’s acceptance are revealed by an examination of the
constant evolution of the image of hepatitis B infection before the eyes of lay Americans.
The hepatitis B vaccine’s disease target, as this analysis has shown, was framed very
differently in the shot’s first decade of existence than it was in subsequent decades. Textual
and visual representations of the disease in the 1970s and 1980s indicate that lay observers
were initially given little reason to worry about hepatitis B infection or anxiously anticipate
its vaccine. Over the course of the 1980s, however, the disease itself was no longer
represented as the province of marginalized groups but rather as a deadly killer akin to
AIDS—albeit preventable with the fruits of the most cutting-edge scientific technology.
The widespread adoption of hepatitis B vaccine laws that followed in the 1990s reflected
the fears and hopes of a nation stricken by AIDS, briefly smitten with biotechnology, and
hobbled by a broken health care system—all told, a set of preoccupations that were directly
reflected in ever-evolving portrayals of hepatitis B itself. The vaccination of children,
specifically, presented the most expedient means of addressing these fears, as the remarks
of health officials, and the compliance of legislators and communities, reveals. The nation’s
hopes and fears would change shape again, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and so too
would perceptions of hepatitis B and its vaccine—but this would occur only after the
vaccine was made mandatory for every child in the nation.
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